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In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District
of Pennsylvania-Pittsburg,1855.
JONES ET AL vs. CINCINNATI COAL COIPANY.
THE COAL BARGES.

1

Coal barges, being large, rough trunks or boxes, made merely for transporting
coals, and usually sold for lumber at the end of the voyage, and not having any
coasting license, are not the subject of admiraltyjurisdiction.

The constitution of the United States, according to the views
taken of it by the Supreme Court for the first fifty years of our
Federal Government, confined the admiralty jurisdiction of the
courts to tide waters; and considered that, however large were the
streams on lakes, yet if the water in them was not tidal, no admiralty jurisdiction could be exercised over them.2 Although, therefore, an act of 1789, which gave the court jurisdiction over enrolled
and licensed vessels, spoke, in one place, indiscriminately of "waters navigable from the sea," our lakes, which had been the scene
of naval victories between ships of war, and our western rivers, of
lateyears navigated bylarge steamers freightedwith immense cargoes,
were for more than sixty years regarded as beyond any constitutional
control of the admiralty. In 1845, however, 3 Congress taking a more
extensive view of its constitutional rights, passed a law giving to the
federal courts jurisdiction "in matters of contract and tort arising
in, upon, or concerning steamboats and other vessels of twenty tons
burden and upwards, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade,

and at the time employed in business of commerce and navigation
between ports and places in different States and territories upon
I Extract from the MS. of 3 Wallace, Jr.
2 The Thomas .Tefferson, 10 Wheaton, 428; Orleansvs. Phebuas, 11 Peters, 175.
3 Act of February 26, 1845.
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the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes." This law
was decided in 1851, in Ihe PropellerGenesee Ohief vs. Pitzhugh,'
to be constitutional; and the Supreme Court, reversing its earlier
decisions, as not made upon a sufficiently comprehensive view of the
constitution, and of the extent, progress and necessities of the
country, seemed, in that leading case, to declare that the admiralty
jurisdiction granted by the constitution to the federal government,
and the exercise of which Congress might allow to the courts when
it pleased, extends to all public navigable lakes and rivers where
commerce is carriedon.
In this condition of the law, a coal barge, loaded with coals, and
on its way from Pennsylvania into another State, was coming down
the Monongahela, a considerable and important stream at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, but one having numerous dams and locks in it;
and one which, though navigable in the rainy season, for small
steamers, is perhaps hardly to be reckoned one of the great navigable rivers of the West. Coming out of a lock in the river, this
barge ran foul of another barge loaded with coal, and fastened to
the shore, but standing out further in the stream than she had any
right to be. The descending barge was broken and sunk with her
cargo, and a libel by its owner having been allowed and sustained
by the District Court, the case came here by appeal. These western
coal barges, it may be added, are rough trunks, being flat-boats.
with sides, made merely for transporting coals, and, owing to the
trouble of returning up stream with them, usually sold as lumber
at the end of the voyage. They have no coasting license.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GRIER, J.-The subject of dispute proposed by the libel, is a
collision between two coal barges loaded with coal. They are not
ships or vessels in the maritime sense of the terms. They do not
take out a coasting license. They are generally mere open chests
or boxes of small comparative value, which are floated by the stream
and sold for lumber at the end of their voyage. A remedy in rem
' 12 Howard, 443.
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against such a vessel, either for its contracts or its torts, would not
only be worthless but ridiculous ; and the application of the maritime law to the cargo, and hands employed to navigate her, would
be equally so.
The case of The Propeller Genesee Cief,reversing the former
decisions of the Supreme Court, (which had adopted the English
definition of navigable rivers, and bounded the jurisdiction of admiralty courts by tide water,) does not necessarily extend the sceptre
of the admiralty over every stream whose occasional floods or factitious basins may suffice to float a steamboat. If it was unreasonable to refuse to ships and steamboats on our great lakes and rivers
the benefit of the remedies afforded by courts of admiralty, it may
be equally so to apply the principle and practice of the maritime
law to everything that floats on a fresh-water stream. Every mode
of remedy and doctrine of the maritime law affecting ships and
mariners, may be justly applied to ships and steamboats, but could
have no application whatever to rafts and flat-boats. A court of
admiralty is not needed to try common law actions of trespass; or
administer common law remedies in any form.
The act of 1845 extends the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty to
"the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes." On other
navigable rivers it seems to have been assumed by virtue of the
decision of the Supreme Court, and without regard to the limitations of the act of Congress, either as to place or subject. But the
Court having decided this act of Congress to be constitutional and
binding, it must govern the question as to the subjects which it defines, even if it be not considered as denying such jurisdiction on
the navigable waters omitted.
Tlis act confines the jurisdiction of admiralty courts on the lakes
and rivers, to "matters of contract and tort in, upon, or concerning
steamboats and other vessels of twenty tons burden and upward,
enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and at the time employed in business of commerce and navigation between ports and
places in different States and territories upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes."
The Supreme Court, in speaking of this provision in the act of
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1845, and of the act of 1789, says-" These laws are both constitutional, and ought therefore to be carried into execution. The jurisdiction, under both laws, is confined to vessels enrolled and licensed
for the coasting trade ; and the act of 1845 extends only to such
vessels when they are engaged in commerce between different States
and territories. It does not apply to vessels engaged in the domestic commerce of a State, nor to a vessel, or boats, not enrolled
and licensed for the coasting trade under the authority of Congress."'
It follows, that in order to show the jurisdiction of the District
Courts of the United States in "1matters of contract and tort"
arising on the lakes and other navigable rivers, the libellant should
aver and prove the facts and conditions stated in the act of Congress of 20th of February, 1845. In this case no amendment to this
effect can be made conformably with the facts of the case.
DECREE REVERSED, and the cause dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The question of costs reserved for further hearing.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
CARRYL vs. TAYLOR.

2

1. When a ship has been seized under a foreign attachment issued out of a State
Court and is in the hands of the sheriff, a subseqnent seizure by the marshal under an attachment for mariner's wages issued out of the District Court of the United
States, can operate only as a contingent seizure, and depends for its efficacy on
the event of the ship or its proceeds, or part of them, being afterwards discharged
from the seizure under the process of the State Court.
2. There is no such superiority in the United States Court or in its attachment for
mariners' wages, as entitles such a process to override and frustrate the previous
seizure under the process of the State Court; and a sale under it while the ship
remains in the custody of the State Court, or after the State Court has sold it under
the foreign attachment proceeding, is void for want of jurisdiction of the subject
matter.
3. In a harmonious system of government the same property may be the subject of
several seizures on writs from different Courts, but all after the first seizure must
I The Propeller Genesee vs. Fitzhugh, 12 Howard, 458.
2 This case, tried at Nisi Prius, will be found reported in 2 Am. Law Reg. 324,
opinion of KANF, J.; also, opinion of WOODWAnD, J.at p. 333.
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be subordinate to it and contingent, and can take effect only after the first seizure
has been satisfied or released.
4. It is an essential rule of harmony, that, among co-ordinate jurisdictions, that one
is exclusive which isfirst attached.
5. Our foreign attachment is a procedure in rem, and a sale of chattels under it
passes the title clear of all liens, and the claims of the lien holders attaches to the
proceeds, which will be distributed according to the rights of alL
6. Where chattels are sold as perishable, under a foreign attachment, the whole title is transferred, and all claimants and lien holders must come in and claim
against the proceeds before distribution.
7. Practice where property attached is claimed by a third person.
8. Remarks upon the conflict of jurisdiction between the State Courts and those of
the Union, and on the province of the Admiralty Courts.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LOWRIE, J.-This is an action of replevin for the ship Royal
Saxon. The plaintiff claims title under a sheriffs sale in a foreign
attachment procedure in the State Court, and the defendant under
a marshal's sale, in an admiralty attachment procedure in the District Court of the United States. The two proceedings were partly
contemporaneous ; but the attachment of the State Court was first,
and when the marshal executed his writ he returned that he had
done so, and that he "found a sheriff's officer on board, claiming to
have her in custody," and the case shows that the officer continued
in custody up to the time when the sheriff sold her by order of the
State Court.
These facts raise the question, what is the relative value of these
two"attachments ?
It is admitted that there is no superiority of Courts of admiralty
over common law Courts, that entitles their process to any pre-eminence; yet there are thoughts underlying this admission and appearing in the argument, that tend to shape and control its effect, and
they need some notice.
It is no kind of eyidence of their superiority that their seal is admitted everywhere in evidence; for so is that of a Notary Public.
Neither in England nor here are the, seals of other foreign Courts
so treated; yet both there and here the admiralty is an inferior
Court.
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And there is no peculiarity in the principle that all the world are
chargeable with notice of what is going on in the court of admiralty ;
for that is only an emphatic mode of stating the ordinary doctrine
of ls Tendens.

Nor is there any peculiarity in the fact that the admiralty process against ships is in rem; for almost all common law Courts have
the same sort of process; in Ohio, a justice of the peace may issue
it; and in substance, the proceeding by a justice of the peace
against a stray cow is exactly equivalent. 6 Watts, 492. It is no
essential part of the form that the thing should be styled the deft.
The District Court is not superior by reason of its being a federal
Court, except so far as it has the advantage of being part of a jurisdiction which, in its highest inpersonations, has the power to declare the limits of its own authority.
It has a peculiar dignity when sitting as a Prize Court, and applying the great principles of international law; but as an Instance
Court it is simply a Court of Common Pleas and Quarter Sessions,
with different forms, and with jurisdiction of a special class of cases,
and in the very nature of things, bound by the usages and statutes
of the State where it sits, or by the statutes of the Union; for it can
have no other -law. Its creation is not the institution of new relations, duties or obligations among citizens; but merely a provision
for enforcing those already existing. Where admiralty laws exist,
it may administer them. Where they do not, it cannot. Like all
other federal institutions, it must submit to have its jurisdiction
strictly construed.
It is not superior as a Court of equity is, because of a power to
draw to itself all the litigation about a particular subject matter, as
being the only Court where the claims of all can be adequately adjudicated ; for it cannot even incidentally bring any other than admiralty claims within its jurisdiction.
It is merely a co-ordinate Court, and its suitors must be content
to have it governed by the principle that, among equal jurisdictions
that is exclusive which is first attached.
This is an essential principle of government, and presents one aspect of the idea, that all the institutions and ordinances of the same
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government have a unity and consistency of purpose which demand
that its functions and functionaries shall act freely and harmoniously as elements of the same system. This ideal unity does not
however exist in practice in every and scarcely in any government,
because of the fundamental difference in the principles that enter into the organization of its different departments. If they represent
different interests, there will be conflicts between them, because their
principles are various.
Hence the jealousy that once existed in England and in this country, between the courts of Chancery and Admiralty on the one hand
and the common law courts on the other ; the former representing
and favoring the monarchical*, antd the latter the democratic element
of government. This jealousy has subsided or died away under the
general prevalence of the popular element in the organization and
control of both; and these conflicts have resulted in advantage to
the general welfare, as all such conflicts do, when they do not spread
beyond the different departments of the government.
There is, practically, a similar element -f discord in this country
in its federal and state judiciary department, arising out of the facts
that their respective jurisdictions are not susceptible of perfectly defined limits, and that the sources of their authority are not identical.
And, since it is not easily seen how there can be any constituted
harmony between the two forms of administration, except so far as
we can rely-on the wisdom and unity of the federal judiciary, it becomes very obvious that we are not without danger of having the
power of the state judiciary very seriously impaired, by a process
similar to that by which the local courts of the Anglo-Saxons were
absorbed by the courts of the Norman kings.
This evil was, in a measure, corrected in England by the gradual
infusion of the popular 'and customary principles into the king's
courts; but that would be no corrective here, if our American notions of the danger of any increase in the centralization of power
are well founded. It is certainly a very prevalent sentiment that
our state courts are competent to settle all juridical questions that
depend upon state laws, and that, even if they are not, it is best
that they should try to do it, and that it is conducive to general in-
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telligence and order that they should be allowed to do it as best
they can.
It is supposed that very much of the energy of the people of this
country arises from the fact that they all participate so largely and
directly in the regulation of their own government; and it would be
considered most disastrous if a majority of Americans, democratic
though it might be, should govern the affairs of each state or township. Our feelings and our attention are most attracted by matters
nearest home, and we can, of course, manage them better than even
wiser people at a distance can do, except in those instances where
our interest is too earnest for our judgement; and if those instances
be not numerous and important enough to form a class by themselves,
they must take their chance of the errors and failings that belong
to humanity.
Certainly there ought to be no encroachment of one department
upon the province of another, founded upon the suspicion that one
will do its duty less honestly or intelligently than the other. And
the danger of encroachment is not avoided merely by the honesty
and intelligence of those who are invested with official functions; for
these qualities are necessary to see the right and understand the defects of others in administering it,'and then a strong and earnest
mind may mislead them into supplying those defects by encroachments which, by reason alone of their beneficial results, become
dangerous precedents of unwarranted jurisdiction.
In the true idea of the American Union there are no discordant
principles between federal and state institutions, though human imperfection may lead to discordant practice. It has done so in this
case, and it becomes our duty to overcome the difficulty as intelligently and discreetly as we are able.
By the seizure, under the foreign attachment of the state court,
this ship was placed in the custody of the law, which means nothing
less than it was in the custody of the State of Pennsylvania, by its
appropriate functionaries, for all the purposes of the process then
commenced against it; and the master was garnisheed or warned to
appear and defend her against the claim. Such is the law, such
was the order of the writ, .and such the act of the sheriff, and an
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arrest. in admiralty is ubstantially the same. Whatever might be
the final result of the Icocess, it was a necessary part of it that the
ship itself should be under the control of the court, and the seizure
was at least as effective as one under an execution would have been.
10 Pet. 400.
When the marshal went to execute the writ of the District Court,
lw found the ship in possession of the State authorities. This was
a condition of affairs not provided for by his writ, and not feeling
himself authorized to exclude the State. officer, he simply attached
the ship without interfering with the previous possession, and substantially reported the state of affairs in his return.
Let it be conceded that this was a sufficient seizure to invest the
District Court with any jurisdiction over the ship that could be
taken by one court over a thing that is already under the control of
another; it could not entitle the marshal to exclude the sheriff.
One officer is not the superior of the other, and no sort of mere
private claim could justify a regulation that would allow of such a
collision of functions. Different arrests on capias or seizures on
execution could not -thus interfere, even if they were from supreme
and subordinate courts. Injunctions and prohibitions interfere in
no such form and with no such effect. Admit that there is more
inherent efficacy in an arrest of a ship for mariners' wages than there
is in our foreign attachment process; still it could not operate with
all its ordinary efficacy after a prior seizure under the other writ,
because the prior control must remain until the prior process should
be terminated, and thus far at least the mariners' arrest must be
subordinate.
But is the arrest for mariners' wages more efficacious ? True, it
is designed to enforce an earlier lien; but that would not prevent
an information in the exchequer to obtain a condemnation for a
breach of the revenue laws, nor a libel in admirality for a maritime
hypothecation; and it could not prevent an absolute sale of the ship
under such proceedings, even though founded an claims of inferior
degree. Whether the inferior claim were in the exchequer or in
admiralty, the sailors would have to follow their vessel there and
make their claim. 9 Wheat. 400; 1 Rob. 178; 10 Mis. 527;
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5 Blackf. 483. They could not disregard the process 2ilready commenced. Even government cannot set up her superior claim for
forfeiture after the ship has been sold under an order of the court
for an inferior one. 3 Price, 97.
There is no peculiar sacredness in the character of such liens
that can add to their efficacy. Like many other remedies and rules
of admiralty, they began in usurpation, because in disregard of tbe
common law, and have never had any other foundation than subsequent ratification, expressed by statute or implied from submission
to them. In the time of Richard II, much of this usurpation was
condemned by statute, just as at other times the usurpations of the
kings were condemned by magna charta. What was left of it and
has hitherto continued to be used in England is, of course, part of
their law-its subsequent general use is a ratification that pardons
the vice of its origin.
So far as we have adopted, by settled custom, this part of the
English law, it is a special part of our common or customary law,
and it is as legitimate as any other, but not superior. How far this
adoption proceeded, came very naturally to be decided in the first
instance by the Admiralty Courts, unless when our several legislatuvs declared it. We did not, as one people, adopt it; for at the
time of its adoption we were separate colonies. We did not so adopt
it by creating Federal Courts of Admiralty, for they were instituted
merely to enforce it, that is, where it previously existed. And so
far as the several States have adopted it, they have done it only as
part of their customary law, and it muit of course be open to alteration by them.
We never adopt it in relation to our inland navigation, except by
using its light in framing some of our statutes. The rules by which
admiralty interprets the relations and duties existing between indi'viduals, can be nothing else than the contract of the parties or the
law of some place where the relation or duty is alleged to have
been created, and this law must vary in different states and countries.
There is no uniformity in the law of mariners' wages. In France
they stand number six among privileged debts or liens, without
counting salvage, which is first of all; and the privilege does not
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continue beyond the completion of the next voyage, and is discharged
by any judicial sale. Code de Com. 191-196. 3 Vincens Legisl.
Com. 117. Pothier de Louage Mar. 55, 226-8. Our limitation of
the lien would be very much the same, if the analogy of our statutes
concerning liens on vessels is worth anything. Ware's Rep. 322.
If the principles which we have just expressed are not substantially
correct, then 'certainly a channel is opened, through the province of
the Admiralty Courts, by which we may enter upon the open sea of
latitudinarian interpretation of federal jurisdiction, and by which
many of our state institutions may be.securely invaded.
We have said that this admiralty process derives no peculiar
effic~y from the fact that it is in rem. Like other judicial proceedings, it is simply conclusive of the matters which it professes to
determine., Thus it decides that a specific thing is -iable to be sold
for a certain debt. In this it does not substantially differ from a
process to enforce a mortgage or a builder's lien, or from an action
of partition, and very many other procedures. If the process
served upon the defendant's property do, not compel him to appear,
the suit may still go on; and even herein our processes of sci. fa.
on mortgages and judgments, and of summons in covenant on a
perpetual rent, as well as our foreign and domestic attachments, are
directly an'alagous. The peculiar style of the action is very convenient; but it is not intended or expected that the ship shall make any
defence. Such suits generally proceed on the principle that there
are some interests~and duties to which parties ought to be prepared
to attend by themselves or their agents, on a very summary kind of
-warning.
It is supposed that the foreign attachment, because it affected
only the title of the defendant, could not affect the mariner's liens
for wages. But a lien is not a title to a thing, but a right to
present a claim against it and demand payment out of it; and a
mariner's lien is such a right as can be asserted only by judicial
process. It gives no right in the vessel until condemnation. Since,
therefore, the defendant in the foreign attachment was the sole
owner of it, that writ took the custody of the whole title, and then
the mariners could not interfere with it, except by some direct
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application to the department of government which-had it in charge,
or to some superior one. The law could not take it for them into
custody, for it had it already for another purpose, and therefore for
all purposes to which any one might claim that it ought to be applied
by the State.
Were, then, the mariners' liens gone by the operation of the
foreign attachment? Certainly not; for the law does not apply its
remedies so as to do wrong to any one. The foreign attachment
-was a conditional sequestration of the ship, and it might be released
from the custody of the law either by defeat of the action or by
bail or by payment of the debt, just as an arrest in admiralty might
0
be. Such contingencies attend all such seizures.
In a harmonious system of government there can, therefore, be
nothing to prevent a second judicial seizure of the same property,
subject to the control already taken of it in a former case, even by
a different tribunal. This is the constant Practice in the service of
foreign attachments and executions from the same court or from
different courts, and it is most completely illustrated in the case of
executions issued by different justices of the peace to different
constables against the same defendant. In a very recent case at
Pittsburgh, ffarberson vs. McCartney, one constable attempted, by
an early sale, to get ahead of aprevious levy by another, on property
not easily removable, and we corrected his haste and declared the
second levy subordinate to the first.
When the different processes issue from different courts, the
court by whose process the property is converted into money,
marshals the liens according to their legal order and distributes it,
whether they are liens at large or of record. This is the constant
practice in relation to the liens of carriers, factors, consignees and
landlords, and all others having the same right; for the law does
not use its power to their disappointment. And this principle is a
mere corollary of that which attributes to all judicial sales the effect
of discharging all liens, and which was demonstrated by Chief
Justice Gibson, 3 Rawle: 126. And there is no matter of courtesy
in this, but of mere duty, on the part of those who have to administer a system that was intended to work harmoniously.
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'That maritime liens and the United States Courts are a part of a
more general system, does not hinder them from entering into this
intended harmony-they are still part of our one system. A generous confidence and courtesy between different, even judicial functionaries, will not embarrass them in the performance of their respective duties; for certainly the forms of judicial procedure, like those
of other business, are sus'ceptible of some accommodation, and can be
adapted under all circumstances to secure the end for which they
are designed, and especially to the general frame of government of
which they form a part. It is not at all strange for courts to exercise
a very large discretion under extraordinary circumstances for the
purpose of giving their process an orderly, efficient, and equitable
direction. Eden's JBankr. Law, 339, 1 Mason, 409. And when
access to a common superior is difficult, there is room for consultation and concession, at least as to forms.
We discover nothing that need have prevented an arrangement in
this case, by which either court might have sold the ship and paid
the mariners, and the surplus would have remained in, or been ordered into the other to answer the further demands against it there.
It is very much to be regretted that this was not thought of by either
court in the course of the cause. Since it was not done, we must
now decide the rights that have arisen out of the conflicting practice.
We have said enough to show that the whole custody of the ship
was in the state court, and that the mariners' liens would have been
protected there, had they been presented. The next question is,
were the mariners' under the necessity of presenting them in the
State court, in case it should go on to the sale of the ship under the
foreign attachment process?
We have already indicated our opinion that they were; but there
are further reasons for it. Our foreign attachment proceeding, and
also our execution attachment are as fully in rem, ds an attachment
in admirality, with this difference,-that the formerdepends upon the
allegation that the defendant has the title, while the latter is altotogether irrespective of title, except so far as a rightful possession
is necessary to a rightful use of the ship.
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By our writ, the ship or other thing is taken into the custody of
the law, and he -who has the possession is garnished to defend all the
interests which the thing represents, and his relation to the property
requires that he should defend them, or give notice to the owners to
look to their own interefts. It is a part of the process that all
claimants may interven& directly for themselves, either by a formal
common law interpleader, or by an informal one. 1 Troub. and H.
Prac. by Wharton, 370; 4 Rawle, 109; 2 ib. 37; 4 Binn, 61; 9
Yin. Abr. 419, title Interpleader. -Brooke's Abr. same title.
Mrcunn vs. Carothers, 9 Pa. Law Journal, 184.
And it seems to be really essential that this should be the effect
of the process in its operation on personal property. The articles
attached are often very numerous, and 'when sold are delivered to
numerous people, and the process would do great wrong if it should
leave the lien on the goods, while- it is thus scattering them to the
winds. If goods were thus sold, it must necessarily result in a
great sacrifice of property. A lien on a ship's cargo or furniture,
would not be worth much after a sheriff's sale, and they would not
sell for much under a threat of an admiralty attachment.
No doubt the property might be of such a character-a ship, for
instance-that it might well be sold subject to a lien; but to do
so would seem to require a special order. Obviously these reasons
do not apply to land attached, and there is no need of adjudicating
upon its title. As in the case of an inquest of office for escheat or
forfeiture, the principal fact only, and not the title, is in question.
Yet the posession of land is taken under the writ of attachment, and
the rents sequestered into court, and the decree of the court must be
conclusive as to the title to them. And such is necessarily the case when
a debt is attached; for the debtor is summoned as garnishee, and
the judgment may be that he pay the whole debt to the plaintiff in
the attachment, and not to his creditor. If the debt shall have
been previously assigned to another person beforeit was attached,
the assignee must, on notice from the garnishee, interplead and establish his prior right, or his title will be lost. (20 Johns. 229.)
The note in 4 Cowen, 520, is relevant to several aspects of this
case.
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But there is another view of this foreign attachment proceeding
that is quite as direct and conclusive. By the execution of the writ
the State takes specific chattels into its possession for certain purposes. In our practice, this purpose cannot be reached in less than
about nine months, and it is very apparent that this delay may be
ruinous of many articles. The interest of all concerned in them is
that they should be sold, and the State exercises her best discretion
when she directs this to be done. This is the means adopted to
protect the interest of all who have any title to the property or
claim upon it, and their rights are transferred to the proceeds.
Here again, if the sale should be of many articles, as it most frequently is, and if it should be made subject to all claims except the
one intended to be satisfied by the suit, it is very apparent that
those claims would be most effectually destroyed by a proceeding
that is pretending to protect them.
In such a case the government acts for the benefit of all, and its
sale confers an absolute title. The counsel have referred to authorities enough to sustain so plain a principle: Parker's Rep. 70 ; Plow.
465; 1 Freem. 185; 2 Keb. 381; 12 Co. 73; 1 Vent. 313; 2
Inst. 168; 4 Johns. 34; 5 Mason, 481. We may add that the
power with which the law invests the master to hypothecate or sell
all interests in both ship and cargo, in a case of necessity, is afiother
expression of the same principle. 4 Com. Bench R. 149 ; 7 Mees.
& W. 322; 1 Exch. Rep. 537; 3 B. & Ald. 237. The effect of
such a sale on the mariners' liens is very clear. They were discharged from the ship and attached to the proceeds, and those they
could not possibly reach without some application to the Court that
had the custody of them.
From all this it seems to follow that the arrest for the sailors
depended for its efficacy upon a contingency that never happened.
The proceeding in the State Court totally exhausted the subject
matter of their contingent seizure, and prevented it from ever reaching the District Court. Its decree was therefore in relation to a
subject over which it had no control, and was consequently void.
We may admit that a replevin suit would not prevent an attachment for a lien ; because in replevin, as in ejeetment, the title or
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possession alone- is in controversy, and the question.of lien is totally
independent of it. Besides, in such a suit the property is never
taken into the possession of the Court, no more than a man is 'when
he gives bail on a capias.
Possibly it might be soid of a judgment in foreign attachment,
that a sale under it, after the arrest for the sailors' wages, ought to
have been made subject to them, especially if their amount were
ascertained ; but it would be impossible to expect a sale for the purpose of preserving the value of the thing to take this form.
To say that the Sheriff's vendees might have intervened in the
District Court, is to assume that the proceeding in the State Court
had not passed the title to the thing which was in their custody, and
which they had sold, and this begs the very question of' the cause.
To say that the Sheriff might, in case the District Court had
sold first, have applied there for the surplus, is certainly very proper,
if it can possibly be admitted that the District Court could unceremoniously take the ship out of the custody of the State Court and
sell it.
It is very true that the effect which-we have felt bound t6 attribute
to the f6reign attachment proceeding, may sometimes cause delays
in enforcing sailors' liens; but this cannot be avoided. There are
very many other circumstances that may cause such delays. A
seizure for a forfeiture or for, a hypothecation may do so, and
especially one for salvage.
The law is neither omnipotent nor
omnipresent, at least in its judicial impersonations, and it does not
intend that its favors even to sailors shall apply in all cases and under
all circumstances. It is sufficient that they are favored by the general
rule, and, like others, they must expect disappointments in exceptional
cases.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
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'It is understood that,this case.wilibe taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States.

BRETT vs. CHILLtS.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
BRETT VS. CHILLAS.
Articles of co-partnership having been formally executed, it is not competent for

one partner to prove by parol that a consideration was to be paid by the other
for making the contract, other than appears in the instrument; there being no
allegation of mistake or fraud in preventing the insertion of the stipulation.

Appeal from the Common Pleas of Philadelphia.
A bill was filed, praying a dissolution and settlement bf partnership accounts.
Upon reference to the Master, one of the charges against Brett
was for the payment, out of the partnership assets, of his -note for
$1000, in favor of one Mitchell. This payment was made by Chillas, who kept the accounts, and attended to the pecuniary affairs
of the partnership.
Brett objected to this, alleging that it was chargeable to Chillas,
under a contract by which Chillas assumed its payment; and he
offered to show by one Alexander Harrison, "that at. the time of
the formation of the firm it was specially agreed that Chillas should
assume this debt of $1000 as a consideration for his going into
the partnership-as a special consideration for the partnQrship.
This agreement was made prior to the preparation and execution
of the articles of copartnership." It was objected to as varying the
written contract set forth in the articles.
These articles were by indenture, and the material parts were1. A stipulation for a partnership for five years.
2. That the capital should consist of $5000 in cash, paid by
Chillas, and the machinery, &c., then in use by Brett, valued at

$5000.
8. That the partners should be equally interested in profits and
losses.
6. That neither should draw out more than $700 per annum for
his private use.
8. And the said Alphonse Brett doth for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators,, further covenant with the said David
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Chillas, his executors and administrators, that the Jiabilities of him,
the said Alphonse Brett, are not other or greater than the several
amounts scheduled in the paper hereto annexed.
In this schedule no mention was made of the note in question.
The master rejected the evidence, for the following reasons,
stated in his report:
This evidence was rejected by the master at the time, and he has
seen no reason subsequently to modify his decision. Notwithstanding the ingenious ground upon which the offer is based, it will be
clearly seen that the effect of the testimony is to vary the solemn
written articles between the partners. By the eighth article, Brett
covenants that his liabilities, i. e. the liabilities of what has been called
the old firm, do not exceed the scheduled amount of $843 69. Besides this direct engagement, there is an implied covenant to meet
these liabilities, as he was otherwise bound to do. The testimony
offered was to show that there was another note of Brett's beyond
those scheduled, which Chillas, and not Brett, covenanted to take
up. .This is, in fact, adding a new article to the written agreemenit;
for the note derived its origin from the very same transactions
respecting which the parties were contracting. It is impossible to
separate one of these transactions from the rest and say that it
formed the subject of one contract, and that the remaining transactions were the basis of another, when the motive and consideration of both* contracts was the same. The mutual covenants
of the articles- are the mutual considerations upon which the parties
have contracted.
To show that Chillas agreed that if Brett would take him into
partnership upon the terms of the articles, he would take up this
note, is to show that for the same covenants of Brett, that is, for
the same consideration as is expressed in the articles, Chillas
agreed to do more than he covenanted to do by them. This is
to extend his liability beyond the written stipulations, and thus to
vary them. If the offer had been made to prove facts contemporaneous'with the execution of the articles themselves, and if
these facts had gone to show fraud or mistake, the testimony might
have been admitted; but this was not the offer as understood by the
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master. The first statement was that the evidence would show that
the special agreement was made "at the time of the formation of
the new firm," apparently referring to an earlier date than that of
the instrument, and this offer was afterwards expressly modified into
proof of an agreement "prior to the preparation and execution of
the articles."
In Rearick's Executor8 vs. 1?earick, 3 Harris, 66-72, the last
leading case on the subject, the Court say, "that in the somewhat
unsteady course of decision upon this vexed point of evidence, if
any principle has been adhered to with tenacity, it is that oral proof,
to vary or affect a written instrument, must be confined to what
occurred at the execution of it. Even thus restricted, it is acknowledged to be full of danger. To avoid, therefore, what-would
really be a social calamity, it is recognized as a settled maxim, that
oral evidence of an agreement or understanding between parties to
a deed or other written instrument, entertained before its execution,
shall not be heard to vary or materially affect it." Afterwards the
familiar rule is re-affirmed, that all prior negotiations and understandings are merged when a contract is once reduced to writing. As
the offer was made, this case is directly in point; as is Hill vs. Gaw,
4 Barr, 493-495. It is also material to observe that no evidence
was offered to show an omission of the alleged stipulation fronthe
articles by fraud, or by mistake. In either of these cases equity
would relieve, upon clear and undoubted proof of the fact. But
these form exceptions to the general rule, which otherwise excludes parol evidence to affect a written contract, as rigidly in
equity as at common law. This consideration also disposes of the
case of Campbell vs. McClenaclsan, 6 S. & R. 171, cited by the
counsel for Mr. Brett. There the proof was of a verbal promise
at the time of the execution of the writing; and the Court say
that to refuse its performance was a trick of which they would not
permit the defendant to avail himself; thus distinctly putting the
case upon the ground of fraud, contemporaneous with the execution
of the articles. In the answer of Brett to the allegation of the bill,
that his debts were $2048 instead of $843 69, he says that Chillas
had agreed to pay him this $1000 for coming into the concern,
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and that he drew, as he was entitled to draw, on this sum as against
complainant, and hence the overplus arose. The answer, so far
as it is responsive to the bill, is generally evidence for the defendant ; but it is nevertheless subject to the general rules
respecting the relevancy and competency of testimony. The defendant cannot introduce proof by way of answer which would.be
rejected if offered in any other way, and his own statement of the
prior contract of Chillas, though differing materially from the testimony offered before the master, is just as clearly a variation of the
written articles. "
The Court below confirmed the report. On the appeal, the ruling
of the master on the question of evidence, was the only exception
pressed.
Guillou, for Exception. (i. B. Penningtonwas with him.) The
agreements were essentially distinct. The partnership, its terms and
conditions, the relations of the parties and their relative rights, are
the subject of the articles, and tfiere is no attempt to modify or alter
them. But the contract or agreement to form a partnership had
no place in the articles. There is nothing there about consideration. The formation of the partnership was itself the consideration for this promise to pay. Beside, the case is within the oft repeated rule that to obtain a writing for one purpose and use it for
another, is a fraud which lets in evidence to show what was the intention. 1 Spencer, 180; 5 Gil. 298; 20 Ohio, 147; 2 Har. 308;
6 Barr, 128; 7 Barr, 118; 1 Har. 49; 4 Bar. 166; 2 ib. 13; 6
S. & R. 171; 1 Jones, 238; 6W. & S. 516; 9 Bar. 335; 3 ib.
251; 16 S. & R. 424.
iMtellurtrie contra. The only consideration .pretended is the
contract of partnership, and the agreement making that sets out a
consideration-the mutual contracts and contributions. Whether
the consideration for an executory contract forms part of it, is the
real question. Whatever that wae has been reduced to writing, and
must speak for itself. All previous bargains on the same subject
are presumably merged in the document purportingto be a contract.
1 Cox. 402; 2 Stark. Ev. 548-51; Best on Ev. 245; 3 Barr, 251;
7 S. & R. 60; 9 Barr, 335; 1 W. & S. 195. Fraud, mistake, or
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even an intention to insert the stipulation not being pretended, the
case does not come within'any of the exceptions to the general
rules, viz: The presumptions-i. That a written contract embodies
2. That all previous negotiations are merged
all the bargain.
therein. These exceptions, 1. Evidence to show that a document
was made in partial execution of the contract. 2. Error in the
draftsman. 3. An agreement to treat the omitted clause as if inserted. 4. Mistake in the use of words, will embrace most of
the cases, if examined apart from the reasoning of the judges.
The rule, that to use a written contract for another than the intended purpose, is such a fraud as lets in evidence, is obviously a.
mere begging the question, how is the contract to be shown. There
could be no presumption of merger of the whole contract in the
writing under such a rule, and it is almost without other support
than extra judicial reasoning.
If this is admitted, Cbillas is made to break his covenant against
drawing more than a certain sum, and Brett excused from what is
otherwise an admitted breach of his covenant as to the amount of
his indebtedness. McKennan vs. Doughman, 1 Penn. 417; Collingwood vs. Irvin, 3 W. 306.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Kiox, J.-The reasons given by the Master for excluding the
testimony of 'Alexander Harrison, are sound and we adopt them.
If received, it would have varied the terms of the written contract,
and as neither fraud nor mistake was alleged, this could not be permitted.
We are disposed to adhere strictly to the rule which interdicts
the admission of parol evidence, where its effect would be to establish a contract different from the one evidenced by the written
statement of the parties.
The argument that the agreement on the part of Chillas to pay
the Mitchell note of one thousand dollars, upon consideration that
he should be admitted as a member of the firm of Brett & Co., was
an independent contract, is plausible, but not satisfactory. The
agreement of the parties in forming the copartnership, was an en-
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tirety, and all its terms are presumed to be incorporated in the articles, signed and sealed by the parties. In the absence of fraud or
mistake, this presumption is a conclusive one.
The other errors assigned were abandoned upon the argument.
Decree affirmed, and it is ordered that the appellant pay the
costs which have accrued upon the appeal.
In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Error to Allegheny County District Court.'
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY VS.

M'CLOSKEY'S ADM'Ro

1. The jury in estimating damages under the Act of April 15, 1851, may take into
consideration the age, habits, health, and pursuits of the deceased. The measure of damages is the absolute value of the life lost, measured according to its
own merits, and not according to the necessities of the kindred.
2. The principle that allows an action for death of a freeman caused by negligence
discussed and re-stated.
3. The personal representatives may continue an action commenced under the statate, and recover the very damages to which deceased would have been entitled,
had he survived until verdict.

The ease was argued by
Win. A. Stokes, Esq., for the plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Shaler & Stanton for defendant in error.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LOWRIE, 3.-William McCloskey lost his life in a collision of
trains on the Pennsylvania Railroad, and his administrator brings
suit for the injury, and the question which we have to consider is
the measure of damages appropriate to such a case.
,The learned Judge of the Court below allowed the jury to find
the damages according to the value of the life lost, and suggested
that, in estimating them, they might compute them by the probable
accumulations of a man of such age, habits, health and pursuits as
the deceased during what would probably have been his lifetime;
and then added "I think this would be a fair measure of damages
in this case ; but if the jury can find a better rule than the one
suggested, they are at liberty to adopt it."
To this it is objected that it gives to the representatives of the
deceased more than compensation, that is, more damages than they
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have suffered by the death; and that thus the judgment acquires a
punitive character, which, it is said, could not have been intended;
since the law has manifested its punitive will in a different form,
by providing for the punishment of the really guilty persons, the
servants of the company, in the Act of 1st April, 1836.
The latter part of this argument is answered by saying that there
are many cases in which vindictive damages are given, though the
act is also subject to punishment, and this is a denial of the unexpressed premise of the argument, and therefore the conclusion is
left without support; and we are saved the necessity of.showing
that it is a mere assumption to call such damages punitive. Besides this, we cannot say that a statute, providing for the punishment of "gross negligence" or "wilful misconduct," covers the
very ground on which this case rests.
The main purpose of the argument, however, is to show that the
representatives appointed by the law in sucli a case, are entitled to
no more damages than they have individually sustained, and this
requires a more extended consideration.
Heretofore no action has been allowed, among us, for the death
of a freeman, and the novelty of the case contributes to the difficulty of determining it,, and warns us to proceed with appropriate
caution. But strange as the case is in our jurisprudence, we, are
not without analogies here and elsewhere, which may furnish us

some light.
The principle that requires compensation for the death of a
freeman is not at all new in history. It was long an institution
among our Anglo-Saxon ancestors, and perhaps it was never positively abolished, but rather died out under the influence of the
Norman conquest, and the centralizing power of the King's Courts,
which treated all such wrongs as wrongs done to the King, and hence
criminal offences. It seems to have been an institution common to
all the Germanic nations, and perhaps to every people that rose one
degree above the savage life, and were still striving to rise.
With them it was intended as a compensation to surviving kindred,
and as a means of preventing the disorders that follow in the train
of private revenge.
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There are indications of its existence among.the Romans, (Dig.
9, 2, 7, 4, also 9, 2, 9, and 31,) though Pasquier (Institutes de
Justinian, 4, 3,) expresses doubts about it. Yoet (Pandects. 9, 2,
11,) and Pacius (Analysis Institutionum, 4, 3, 1,) refer to it as
existing there and also in Holland, Netherlands, and perhaps in
some other parts of modern Europe, and we have evidence of its
existence in Scotland. Erskine's Inst. 592 b. 13. Bell's Principles of Law, 749; 10 Eng. L. and Eq. R, 437; as it existed
among the Romans, the damages recovered by the kindred were
not by way of hereditary succession; for damages for wrongs done
to the body of a freeman were not allowed to pass that way. Dig.
9, 3, 5, 5; Pothier's Pand. 9, 3, 12.
A recent English statute, 9 and 10 Vict. c. 93, seems to have
revived the principle of the old Saxon law, and to allow the relations of the deceased to recover damages, to be apportioned among
them according to the injury resulting to them respectively. In
form, therefore, the action is for their own loss, and not a survival
of the right of action for. the injury to the deceased. Yet the
English Courts have not known how to estimate the damages,
except according to the value of the life lost. 10 Eng. L. and Eq.
Rep. 437; Armsorth vs. S. E. Railway Co., 11 Jurist, 758; 6
Harr. Dig. 273. And this statute seems to leave other injuries to
the person just as they were before, and consequently a death from
another cause before compensation recovered, i' not provided for.
But it is asked, how'can one that is dead be compensated by a
civil procedure, for injuries done to him in his life, and especially
for the loss of his life ? This directs us to another aspect of the
present claim that is not so new as the other.
In the early stages of our law, all rights of action for wrongs
done, not breaches of contract, died with the injured person. This,
however, was altered by statute 4 Ed. 3, c. 7, and this alteration has
been very largely extended by construction; and by our statute 24th
Feb'y, 1834, § 28, nothing was excepted but slander, libel and
wrongs to the person. Many of the cases thus declared to survive,
involve questions of compensation and exemplary damages for
wrong and insult, fraud and malice, which are to be decided upon
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and executed after the injured party is beyond the reach of civil
compensation, and yet the injury is measured just as if he were still
living.
There are abundant indications of the same law of survivorship in
the Roman law in regard to such injuries. Inst. 4, 12, 1; Dig.
44, 7, 26 and 58; Dig. 50, 17, 139 and 164 ; -Heineccius Elementa Juris. ss. 1198, 1194; Pacius Analysis Inst. 4, 12. And
these embrace a wider range of injuries than have been heretofore
saved from death by our law; for they include all cases actually
commenced in the lifetime of the injured party, and prevent their
abatement by his death.
Our Act of 15th April, 1851', seems to express its purpose better
than the English one before referred to;' for in one section, it
simply provides that the action commenced for injuries to the person
shall not abate by the plaintiff's death, but shall survive by substitution of his personal representatives; and in another, that if no
suit for damages be brought during life by a party mortally injured
by negligence or violence, then the widow, and if there be no widow,
the personal representatives, may maintain an action for damages
for the death.
The first of these sections is very plain, and it provides that the
personal representative may continue the action commenced ;'that
is; may proceed and recover the very damages to which the deceased
would have been entitled' had he survived until verdict and judgment.
The other section is somewhat less definite in regard to the
damages intended; but this very indefiniteness is proof that no
IOur Act is as follows:
"That no action hereafter brought to recover damages for injuries to the person
by negligence or default, shall abate by reason of the death of the plaintiff; but
the personal representatives of the deceased may be substituted as plaintiff, and
prosecute the suit to final judgment and satisfaction.
"That whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence,
and no suit for damages be brought by the patty injured during his or her life, the
widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives,
may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned."P. L., p. 674.
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other thought was in the mind of the Legislature than the wrong
and damage done to the decedent; else it would have been made to
appear. If one section related to damages done to the deceased,
and the other to damages done to his relatives, these contrasted
thoughts could hardly have failed to come out clearly in the expression.
But even if this were otherwise, we do not perceive how it could
influence the damages; for they must necessarily be measured by
the absolute value of the life lost, and not by the pecuniary loss
which the designated representatives shall have thereby sustained.
The precept involved in the law is, thou shalt not by negligence or
violence take away the life of another, and the sanction of the law
lies in the duty of compensation for the life destroyed, measured
according to its own merits, and not according to the necessities
and circumstances of his kindred. It is very hard to value: but
not, for that, more uncertain than the speculations in relation to
damages to kindred, which are proposed in its stead.
This thought is involved in the whole course of legislation and
jurisprudence already referred to; and is a rejection of the idea
that the negligence which destroys life is irresponsible, and an
assertion of the principle that all negligence maust answer for its
results, however serious. We have not, heretofore, been startled at
the absurdity of giving a pecuniary compensation for broken limbs,
or ruined health, or shattered intellect, or tarnished reputation. If
the body be all crushed, we have regarded its sufferings as a subject
of civil compensation so long as life smoulders beneath the ruins;
even though there be no capacity to appreciate or enjoy compensation. We ought not to be startled that the duty of compensation
is continued when such a life is smothered out.
We call it compensation, while we admit that money is a very
insufficient and uncertain measure of all such injuries. But it is
the best standard we have, and in practice it is not found to be
absurd. The duty of the wrong-doer to make compensation is very
plain, and such as he has which the law can reach, it compels him
to give; though it may never reach the consciousness of the person
injured. It is an act of distributive justice in vindication of invaded

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. vs. McCLOSKEY'S ADM'R.

417

rights, and it adopts the best approximation to compensation which
the authority of the law.can enforce. And in these times, when
criminal justice is so much out of repute, and, police officers are held
up to public scorn for their diligence, it is found to operate well.
Call it punitive; yet it is only indirectly so, as all compensation is,
and does not wipe out any offence that it involves against the
State.
From our present experience and observation, therefore, we are
unable to discover any substantial error in the instructions complained of. It would be wrong to value a man's life by his probable
accumulations, for most of men make none in a life-time, and many
have arrived at an age when they no longer attempt to make any,
and many women never haike any, and yet every one is entitled to
his life, and we have as yet discovered no standard for its valuation.
It is not human possessions that are destroyed, but humanity itself;
and as this has no mai ket value, it must necessarily be very much
a matter of human feelings.
Hard, then, as the task may be, and however uncertain its results,
it is to be performed by the jury, aided by the cautions and counsels
of the judge, who has been trained in the consideration of juridical
questions.
Looking, on the one hand, to the dignity of human nature as it
has been assailed; and on the other, to the position and rights of
the defendant, and considering the dignity of their own position as
judges of most sacred rights, and their own dignity and responsibility
as individuals, and loving mercy even while doing justice, the jury
must place a money value upon the life of a fellow-being, very much
as they would upon his health or reputation.
The other points in this cause, we feel compelled to dispose of in
a few brief propositions.
A railroad company, carrying passengers, cannot allege that a
passenger is in fault in obeying specific instructions of the conductor,.
instead of the general directions of which he has been informed.
Assuming that a public company of carriers may contract for
other exemptions from liability than those allowed by law, still
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such a contract will not exempt them from liability for gross negligence.
A regulation by which a passenger with live stock on the freight
train is required to remain in the cars which contain his stock, is
not so transgressed, by his being on another part of the train when
it is at rest, as to make him a contributor to his own injury, by that
train being run into by another.
Judgment affirmed.

In the City Court of Now York.
THE PEOPLE VS. HERMAN RISTENBATT.
1. When a prisoner has been indicted by the Grand Jury upon evidence which appeared solely by affidavits accompanying the indictment and agreed to be read,
and the facts in which were conceded to exhibit no legal evidence whatever, of
the violation of a statute concerning false pretences, the Court will quash the
indictment.

2. Indictment defined, and authorities for definition cited.
3. The Grand Jury is without authority to indict for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter, except upon sworn legal testimony, duly taken before a constituted
authority.
4. If there is any legal proof of the offence charged, no matter how little, the
Court will not quash the indictment, but will send it for trial to a petit jury.

This was a motion to quash the indictment against the prisoner
for obtaining money under false pretences. The sole testimony before the grand jury consisted of certain affidavits, which failed to
exhibit any legal evidence of the perpetration of the crime charged.
And on this ground, the motion to quash the indictment which the
Grand Inquest had found, was made.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STEWART, J.-The defendant is before the court upon two indictments for false pretences. Counsel for the accused moves to quash
both indictments, upon the ground that they were found without
any proofs of the commission of the offences preferred. On the argument of the case by Mr. Graham for the prisoner, and the District
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Attorney for the people, it was conceded and agreed on the one side
and on the other, that the preliminary affidavits of the complaining
witnesses, which accompany the indictment, contain all the testimony given before the grand jury, and on which they acted in
ordering these bills. I have read the complaining papers with care,
and it is apparent that they not only fail to exhibit proof sufficient
to indict, but are without any legal evidenice whatever of a violation
of the statute against false pretences. This being manifest, and
having regard to the concession by the learned attorney for the
people-that these primary depositions contain all and precisely
the same facts, matters, and things testified to by the deponents when
before the grand jury, and that the grand inquest had no other
evidence, knowledge or information in the premises than- what is
expressed by the affidavits in question-it i clearly certain that the
defendant has been indicted for two criminal offences, each'a felony,
without legal proof of their perpetration. And now upon this state
of facts, (given preliminarily for a better yiew of the case,) the
court is moved to go behind the indictments and take judicial 'iotice
of this want of proof for the purpose of setting them aside; thus
raising the question, both new and important, whether a criminal
court can pass behind the record to learn if there was any proof
before the grand inquest going to establish the offence alleged,
with a view to quash an indictment lawful in its composition, in
accordance with the rules of pleading and importing absolute verity
upon its face. The criminal books afford almost no authority*for
the exercise of such a power, and I cannot find a precedent among
adjudicated criminal cases either in this country or England, for so
bold an intrenchmeut of the heretofore scarcely disputed right of a
grand jury to indict whom they pleased, when they pleased, how
they pleased, and for what they pleased, with proof or no proof as
they pleased, defying the Court of which they are less than a coordinate branch, against all views of their acts, however demanded
by the rights of the citizen, or needed for ends of public justice;
nor yet is there any decision involving a principle of law or rule of
criminal procedure going to inderdict such innovation when prudently
resorted to for the attainment of truth, and the administration of
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that justice which is the property of all men. Aln indictment as
defined in Jacob', Law Dictionary,upon several authorities cited,
is a "bill or declaration of complaint drawn up in form of law, and
exhibited for some criminal offence." "It is," says Chief Justice
Holt, "a plain, brief and certain narration of an offence committed
by any person, and of the necessary circumstances that concur to
ascertain the fact and its nature." An indictment, in the better
langauge of Mr. Hawkins, P. C., "qs an accushtion made in a
prescribed legal form upon evidence, by a number of authorized
persons, of some criminal offence against the peace of the people,
and when preferred in a court, becomes a record for purposes of
criminal prosecution." The question recurs, may a "bill of complaint drawn up in legal form" be impeached for any cause? That
it may, for' some reasons, will not be disputed; and if for some, why
not in all cases where it is manifest that the body indicting has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter on which the accusation is predicated. If a court may look upon the face of an indictmaent to see if
it contains all the elements necessary to its validity, why may it
not go over to the persons 'who preferred it, to see if they were duly
authorized to do so-to learn if they were constituted of the number required by the Statute, and if so, learn if they are all qualified
according to law, and the like? This, it is said, is not denied.
Very good. Why, then, has not the court power to inquire after
any misconduct of one or more grand -jurors, tending to vitiate
their proceedings, or of others, going to the prejudice of their acts;
or to discover whether, although a crime has been proved, it did not
also appear that it was committed in a foreign State or country; or
if perpetrated within the pale of their jurisdiction, whether it was
not so ancient as to be without the cognizance of the criminal law;
or if within, it ha&not been shown by the testimony of a witness infamous for crime and unpardoned of a conviction for felony: and
further, of like matters? All this, I take it-certainly all except
the latter instance-will not be denied by any one who has given
the subject their attention. The grounds, as it seems to me, for an
interference by, the court in cases of this nature is, that the grand
jury is wholly without authority to indict, upon the well-settled
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principle that no jurisdiction, by any criminal magistracy, can
obtain over the subject matter of a criminal offence, except upon
sworn, legal testimony before a duly constituted authority; as no
jurisdiction can be had of the body of a criminal offender, except
by reason of his personal presence before the power having cognizance of the crime. If this be good law, with all the force of truth
and the strength of justice, how may , grand jury indict any one of
a crime, having for want of proof, no jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the offence; or, if they do, why may not a court go behind the record and relieve the accused of preceding imprisonment,
with the care, expense and degradation of a public trial?, The
answer is not that there is any law to prevent, but that it has never
been done, which, with this court, would be sufficient, if justice to
the citizen did not otherwise require; but when demanded by what
are, in my judgment, the legal rightg of the accused, it is no
answer, and shall not stay this court from a prudent and careful
exercise of its own sense of duty. It is, in my judgment, quite
enough that a grand jury is licensed to act in secret upon ex-parte
testimony in respect to all matters and persons, without permitting
them to indict individuals contrary to the rules of law, and where
no crime has been proved. As for instance, a witness testifies before
the court and jury; a spectator hears a bystander say that the
evidence is corruptly false; upon this, the spectator goes before the
grand jury now in session, and swears that the witness testified to
something which he believes to be utterly false, as a citizen standing hard by said it was so. And upon this an indictment is
ordered for perjury. Is there no relief in such a case, save a public
trial? Cannot the court, these facts appearing, quash the indictment for insufficiency of proof ? If not, why not? The only answer is that there is no authoritative precedent ; if not, it is time for
one; for, if controlled by nothing else, grand juries should-be bound
by the rules of evidence, for upon this, more than anything else,
depends the citizen's safety. In the case of Dr. Dodd, 1 Leech, C.
L., 184, when the defendant was called upon to plead, he challenged
the validity of the indictment upon the ground that it was found
upon the testimony of incompetent witnesses. The court enter-
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tained the objection.
The matter was argued by some of the most
able lawyers at the English bar, before the twelve judges, and it
was only because they decided that the evidence was legal and the
witnesses competent, that the objection failed. It is said, I know,
that the doctrine expressed in this case never obtained as an authority, and does not now prevail as the law upon this subject. The
contrary were quite as easily stated. In the case of Hulbert, 4
Denjo,. 138, the accused, after he had pleaded, and on going to trial,
sought to give evidence relative to the character and amount of
proof before the grand jury, when the indictment was found, with a
view to show that but one, among a number of counts for as many
misdemeanors, had been proved before the body indicting him, which
was denied, as that would be to impel the grand jurors before a
traverse jury, empanneled to try the accused.. In the decision of
this case, Judge Bronson took occasion to say that an indictment
could not be impeached unless upon motion by showing that it was
not found upon sufficient evidence, or that there was any other fault
or irregularity in the proceeding of the grand jury, and added that,
when the ends of public justice required it, a record ought to be set
aside, and when done, that was an end of it. This law is controverted by the assertion that it is but the dictum of a judge in respect to a matter not embraced by the question under the consideration of the court-granted: it is equally the opinion of one of
the ablest Judges that ever held a place in the Supreme Court of
this State. Am indictment is the foundation, so to speak, of a criminal prosecution, and if it is not just and lawful in all its character,
it ought to be broken. Touching the two under consideration, if
there was any legal proof-no matter how little-I would not combat or criticise it for the purpose of granting this motion; but as
there is no lawful evidence whatever before the grand jury to negative the truth of the pretences alleged, I am without doubt of the
power of the court to set them aside, and am convinced of my duty
in the roatter.
The motion to quash is granted.

MORRIS CANAL AND BANKING CO. vs. FISHER.

In the New Jersey Court of Apveals.
THE MORRIS CANAL AND BANKING CO., APPELLANTS, AND SAUMUEL F.
FISHER, APPELLEE.

The bona fide holder of railroad bonds, having no notice of any defect in the title of
the seller, has a perfect title to them, clear of all equities between the company
and seller.

The Morris Canal and Banking Company, being indebted to
George F. Lewis, gave him their note, payable eight months after
date, and deposited with him as collateral, six of their bonds for
$500 each. When the note became due, it was not paid, and Mr.
Lewis gave notice to the company that he should sell the bonds at
the Exchange in Philadelphia, on a day named, and hold them
accountable for any deficiency. The president of the company
answered and remon-urated against the sale of the bonds, saying
that they were not left to be used in that way. Mr. Lewis, however,
put the bonds into the hands of the auctioneer, and they were sold
pursuant to the notice, and purchased by Samuel F. Fisher. There
was no notice given at the sale, of any defect in Mr. Lewis' title,
nor did it appear that Mr. Fisher had any knowledge of the transactions between Lewis and the company.
The company having refused to pay the interest coupons, and
the trustees named in the mortgage given to secure the payment of
the bonds and interest, having declined to institute proceedings to
enforce the payment, Mr. Fisher filed his bill in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey for a foreclosure and sale or sequestration of
the canal, its income and tolls. The case having been brought to a
hearing in that Court, was referred to a master by the Chancellor,
he having been of counsel in the case, before his appointment. The
Master reported his opinion to be in favor of the complainant, and
a decree was accordingly made, that the company pay the interest
due, with costs, and that in default thereof, their revenue, tolls,
issues, profits and dividends be sequestrated, etc. From this decree
the company appealed, and the case was argued before the Court of
Appeals, at November term, .1854, and held under advisement until
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March term, 1855, when the decree was unanimously firmed, and
the following opinion of the Court was delivered by
ELmER, J.-The- complainant, Samuel F. Fisher, was shown to
be the bona fide holder of six bonds of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, the defendants below, and the question upon which the
case on this-appeal mainly turns, is whether the honest acquisition of
these securities, without notice of any defect in the title of the seller,
if a defect there was, confers on him a title, similar to that acquired
by a bona fide holder of money, bills of exchange and promissory
notes, payable to bearer. So far as we are aware, this is a case of
the first impression, and it is certainly one of no little importance.
Similar bonds have been issued, within a few years, by our numerous
railroad and canal companies, to an immense amount, and are daily
sold by brokers and others, and passed from hand to hand by
delivery, without any formal assignment, and without inquiry as to
the title of the possessor.
The case has been elaborately and ably argued on both sides. On
behalf of the appellants, it was insisted that these bonds, being
under seal, are in law specialties, and although in terms payable to
bearer, if they are assignable by delivery only, it is by force of our
statute, which leaves them subject, in the hands of the assignee, to
all the equities, to which they were liable in the hands of the assignor.
Bev. Stat. 801. That such is the law in the case of ordinary bonds,
cannot be questioned. By the common law, such bonds cannot be
assigned, so as to give a right of action to the assignee, although
payable- in terms to an assignee or bearer. Glyn vs. Baker, 18
East, 509; Clar vs. Farmers' Man. Co. 15 Wend., 256. Our
statute, however, authorizes an assignment, whether a bond is, or is
not, payable in terms to an assignee. Sheppard vs. Stites, 2 Hal.
90. And such assignment, it has been held, may be by delivery
for a valuable consideration, without any writing. Allen vs. Pancoast, Spen. R. 68. The mere insertion, therefore, of words, making
these bonds payable on their face to a bearer, is by no means decisive of the question now in dispute. Nor do we think it would
necessarily follow, that they would be subject to whatever equitable
defence might be made against them in the hands of the assignor,
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if they were not legally assignable, so that the assignee could sue
on them in his own name. Smith, in his note to the case of Miller
vs. Race, Smith, L. C. 363, seems to consider that such would be
the result; and no doubt the ability of the holder to sue in his own
name, is essential to render an instrument negotiable, in the full
sense of that expression. But Courts of Equity and Courts of Law
protect the interest of a bona fide assignee. If, however, the
assignee takes no legal, but only an equitable title, they protect,
also, the equities existing at the time of the assignment, between
the maker of the instrument and the assignor. If the bonds in
question are transferable by delivery, so as to confer a complete
title in the possessor, it is not as instruments negotiable under the
law of merchants, as bills and notes are, but as instruments of a
peculiar character, expressly designed to be passed from hand to hand,
and by a common usage known to all, actually so transferred. That
they are on their face payable to bearer, is of course an important
and, perhaps, indispensable circumstance, to show that this was in
fact the design, and that they are so used. But the usage itself,
and in a case like this, where the party issuing them is before the
Court denying the holder's title, the manner in which they were
issued and used by the company itself, are the important facts which
must have the principal influence in determining their true character.
If in point of fact, they are of such a character that a full title
was intended to be conferred on any person who became the bona
fide possessor of them, and this intention was not in contravention
of the law, the original maker has no equity against the assignee.
By the act of issuing a security, which, although in some respects
like an ordinary bond, was in its main characteristic of being
designed to pass freely from hand to hand, and of being so held out
to the world, essentially different, all such equities were designedly
relinquished, and ought not to be regarded by courts of law or of
equity.
That under ordinary circumstances, the property of bank notes
and of bills and promissory notes payable on their face, or by a
blank endorsement, to a bearer, follows the possession, has been long
settled. By analogy to this class of cases, the exigencies of busi-
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ness have from time to time introduced other .securities into the
same category. The Court of King's Bench seems to have hesitated to recognize India bonds as belonging to it, Glyn vs. Baker;but
Parliament immediately interfered and declared them negotiable
instruments. Exchequer bills were so regarded in the case of
Wookey vs. Pole,4 Barn. &Ald. 1.- In the case of Gorgiervs. Meville, 3 Barn. & Cres. 45, bonds of the King of Prussia, which were
shown to be ordinarily passed from hand to hand by delivery, and
so designed, were held to be like money or bills, so as to give a bona
fide possessor the legal title. And in the case of Lang vs. Smith,
7 Bing. 284, the same principle was applied to the case of instruments issued by the government of Naples, although in that case
they were held not to be negotiable, because it was found that they
did not usually circulate, without a certificate, which did not accompany them. Parsons in his recent work on Contracts, vol. 1 p. 240,
expresses the opinion that the common bonds of railroads, fall within
the reasoning and authority of these cases.
The manner in which these bonds are engraved, with coupons
making the interest payable half yearly to the bearer of them, and
all the evidence before us conspire, to show that the company which
issued them, and which now disputes the title of the holder, upon
the ground that they put them into the hands of the seller for a
special purpose, which did not authorize him to dispose of them as
he did, really intended them to circulate, as in fact they do. This
design is indeed quite as apparent as if it was engraved on their
face in express words. The objection now made, that the legal
character of the instrument adopted is such as to frustrate this
design, certainly comes with a bad grace from the party which put
them in circulation. Even as between third parties, we suppose the
common usage to transfer them by delivery, without inquiry as to
the title of the transferree, would justify us in holding these securities to differ from common obligations, in being so far negotiable
that the bona fide possessor shall be held to have a good title.
But the case is still stronger against the party which made and
issued them, with full knowledge of the prevailing usage, and with
the manifest design that they should be so circulated. To permit
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such parties to dispute this result of the usage, would be to permit
them to take advantage of their own wrong. And besides, the
obvious interest of the companies is, that these bonds should be
saleable, free from all questions of equity. They are generally
issued for the express purpose of raising money by their sale. To
declare them subject to the equities existing in the case of ordinary
bonds, upon every transfer of them, would be to strike a blow at
the credit of the great mass of these securities now in the market,
the consequences of which it would be impossible to predict.
We are therefore of opinion that the title of the present possessor
of these bonds must be held to be complete. His right to proceed
on the mortagee, in the manner adopted, follows as a necessary consequence. As to the objections that the bonds were not issued for
any purposes authorized by the stockholders and directors, and that
they are illegal, fraudulent and void, and that the bill of complaint
is not properly drawn, it is only necessary to express our concurrence in the conclusions to which the master came, and in the
reasoning upon which he founded them.
This view of the case renders it unnecessary to enter at large
:upon the investigation of the question so fully discussed by counsel,
whether Mr. Lewis had a right to sell the bonds as he did. Some
of the views taken by the master, in his very able opinion on this
subject, seem questionable. If the bonds in dispute ought to be
considered as placed in Lewis' hands by way of pledge, it is probably because they were securities usually sold in the stock market,
and understood by the parties to be designed for that use; and not
because a party's ordinary bond or mortgage deposited as a collateral,
could be so regarded. No case was produced where the debtor's
own obligation has been held to be a pledge for a debt due by simple
contract. Nor do we think it clear that even a third party's bond
or mortgage, deposited by way of a collateral or a pledge, can be
sold by the pledgee, in default of payment, after notice to the
pledger, unless a known usage or express agreement to do so is
shown. But it is not intended to express any decided opinion on
these points. For the reasons assigned, the decree appealed from
must be affirmed, each party to pay their own costs.

LENNARD vs. BOYNTON.

In the Supreme Court of Geoigia.
FRANCIS LENNARD vs. THOMAS BOYNTON.
One to ivhom a slave is hired for a year, is entitled to no abatement of the price
because of the death of the slave after the commencement of the term.

Assumpsit, &c. in Talbot Superior Court. Decision by Judge
Irverson, September Term, 1851.
Thomas Boynton brought suit against Francis Lennard, on a
note for $100, given for the hire of a negro, for the year 1850, and
payable to Rebecca Boynton, or bearer.
Francis Lennard pleaded that 'the negro died on the 1st May,
1850, and that the note was transferred to Lennard on 1st February)
1851, after it was due; and with notice of this defence.
On motion, the Court below struck out this plea, and this decision
is assigned as error.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LUmPKiN, J.-The only question in this case is, whether when a
negro is hired for a year, and he dies within the time, the hirer
should be allowed a credit upon his note, from the time of the
negro's death to the end of the year, for so much as the hire for
that time would amount to ?
In Scotland, France, Canada, Louisiana, and indeed all those
countries where the Civil Law obtains, it is probable that the hire
would be apportioned. In South Carolina, where the Common Law
has never been adopted throughout, as the basis of their jurisprudence, the same doctrine obtains, and the Courts of that State
apply the same principle to real estate. Biipley vs. Wightman, 4
Mcord, 447.
In Virginia, it has been held, that if a slave who is hired for a
year, be sick or run away, the tenant must nevertheless pay the
hire; but if the slave die without any fault in the tenant, the owner,
and not the tenant, should lose the hire from the death of the slave,
unless otherwise agreed upon. Guage ys. -Eliot, 2 Hen. & Munf. 5.
The reason given by Chancellor Taylor is, that in pursuing this
rule, the act 'of God falls upon the owner, on whom it must
have fallen if the slave had not been hired. Non constat!
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And the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, seem to consider
this decision and the previous ruling of their own, in Ripley vs.
Wightman, that if a man lease a house for a year, and during the
time it is rendered untenantable by a storm, the rent ought to be
apportioned according to the time it was occupied, as decisive of
the question, that where a slave hired for-a year, and dies within
the year, his wages should be apportioned. Bacol vs. Panell, 2
Bailey, 424.
The Supreme Court of Missouri had occasion to consider this
point in Dudgeon vs. Teap, 9 Missouri 867, and while they adhere to
the decision of Chancellor Taylor, and which seems to be the authority for all the subsequent adjudications upon this subject, they state
distinctly, that if the analogies of the law on the subject of rent8
be adhered to with strictness, that thiis doctrine cannot be sustained.
And so we think.
If natural justice requires that rent ought to be abated or apportioned, because the thing to be enjoyed be entirely lost or taken
away from the tenant, it would be unreasonable to allow the owner
hire for a " dead negro."
But we apprehend the principle to be now well settled that where
the lessee covenants to pay rent, he is bound to pay it, whatever
injury may happen to the demised premises; and that if the tenant
would guard himself against loss by fire and tempest, he must introduce into his lease an exception to this effect Paradinevs. tJayne,
Aleyn, 27, cited per Lord Ellenborough, C. J. 10 East, 531;
Argument in Brecknose Company vs. Pritchard, 6 T. R. 751,
recognized per Lord Kenyon C. J. ib. 752; Wood. L. & T. 5th ed.
471, 518. .Belfleur vs. Weston, 1 Term Rep, 312; Alonk vs.
Cooper, 2 Lord Raymond, 1477; Cartervs. Cunniu) 1 Ch. Cases
83, 2 Vernon, 280 ; 1 Fonbl. Eq. 378, 379, and the authorities
there cited.
This is no longer an open question with this Court, as to real
estate. In the well considered case of Whites vs. .Mollyneux. 3
Kelly's R. 124 we held upon a full review of all the authorities,
that in case of express contracts to pay rent, the destruction of the
premises by fire or violence, or any casualty whatever, is not a good
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defence to an action to recover the rent unless there'is an express
stipulation to that effect; and that a Court of Equity could not
relieve against such circumstances.
With that opinion, supported as it is by an overwhelming weight
of authority, we have no reasons to be dissatisfied. Independent
of precedents, and if this were a case of the first impression, why I
ask, should not a party who, by his contract, created a duty or
charge upon himself, be bound to make it good, notwithstanding
any accident by inevitable necessity ?
But it is said that it would be unreasonable that these things
which are inevitable by the act of God, which no industry can avoid,
nor any polisy prevent, should be construed to the prejudice of
any person in whom there is no laches. I. Rep. 97. And the
maxim of the Common Law, Actus Deineminifacit injuriam, is
invoked in aid of the defence set up to the recovery of the hire.
How far this principle was justifiable in adjudging emblements
to those who had an uncertain interest in lands, which was determined between the period of sowing and the severance of the crop,
I will not undertake to say. That the rule, like many others
respecting real estate, was introduced to favor the landed aristocracy
of England, by encouraging husbandry and preventing the ground
from remaining uncultivated is obvious enough.
But where it is assumed as the ground for a legal judgment, that
the dispensation of Providence shall prejudice no one who is guilty
of no default on his part, I beg leave to demur to the proposition.
Not to adduce innumerable other illustrations I refer to one only,
which is directly in point. Negroes were hired at the beginning of
last year, owing to the high price of cotton and other produce, at
the most extravagant rates, throughout the State. Owing to the
unparalleled drought in the middle counties, the failure in the crops
was almost entire. Is not this, actus Dei, in with-holding the early
and the latter rain ? No laches is attributable to the hirer. If
the death of the negro would entitle him to relief, why should not
this other providential visitation ? In our judgment, neither should.
He hired the slave unconditionally. He must comply with his engagement.
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The one view of this matter is simple and intelligible; it is neither
more nor less, than the condition of the party to fulfil his contract.
The other is vague and fluctuating, because it rests on no solid
foundation. For I speak with reverence, when I say that the acts
of God, by hail, drought, inundation, pestilence, tornado, and the
ten thousand judgments, public and private, by which he afflicts for
their good, the children of men, prevent the fulfilment of more contracts, than all human misconduct put together.
Suppose it were otherwise, why should the loss fall exclusively
upon the owner of the reversion or fee? Is it not enough that he.
is deprived of his property? And is not the hirer the quasi owner
for the time being? Does he not take the risks for the year, unless
he stipulates against them? Does he pay the premium by way of
addition to the price of hire, for life insurance? If not, why give
him virtually the benefit of such a policy? Why tax the owner with
it, when he is paid for it? He agrees to take the value of the servant's labor merely; and if he is to be considered as having insured
his life, he should be compensated for the risk.
The uncertainty of the negro's life was equally well known to both
Boynton and Lennard, when the contract for the hire was entered
into between themselves. What power has any Court to modify or
change their contract? When the slave was delivered, the contract
was executed by the owner. His part was performed. Lennard
expressly stipulated to pay the hire; and however hard it may be
upon him to pay wages for services which cannot be rendered, let
it be kept in mind that he brought his hardship upon himself. It
was his own voluntary act, and he has no claims upon the justice of
the Courts to be relieved.
Apart from the principles involved, motives of public policy forbid a recision of this contract. Humanity to this dependent and
subordinate class of our population requires, that we should remove
from their hirer or temporary owner, all temptation to neglect them
in sickness, or to expose them to situations of unusual peril and
jeopardy. We say to them, go, and ihey must go; stay, and they
must stay; whether it be on railroads, the mines, the infected districts or anywhere else. Let us not increase their danger, by
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making it the interest of the hirer to get rid of his cohtract, when
it proves to be unprofitable. Every safeguard, consistent with the
stability of the institution of slavery, should be thrown around the
lives of these people. For myself, I verily believe, that the best security for the permanenc6 of slavery, is adequate and ample protection to the slave at our hands.
Slavery not being tolerated in England, no case precisely in
point could be found in the Reports of that country. In our judgment
the case of rent for demised premises and that of the hire of negroes,
is not only strikingly, but strictly analogous. One is compensation
for the use of houses and lands, the other for slaves. And if the
Courts will not relieve the tenant from the payment of rent, when
the demised premises is destroyed by casuality, .and we have held
that they could not, still more emphatically does policy at least, if
not principle, forbid relief against the hire of a negro who has died
before the expiration of the term. We have great respect for the
distinguished Chancellor of Virginia, Who decided differently, and
for the able tribunals. in our sister States, who have subscribed to
the doctrine thus established. Entertaining a contrary view of
this question, both upon principle and policy, we cannot interfere
to discharge Mr.. Lennard from his undertaking fairly and freely
made, however hard it may appear.
The Judgment af the Circuit Court must be affirmed.

In the Superior Court of Cincinnati-December,1854.
JAMES WILSON & CO. vs. BAILEY & SON.'

1. A receipt containing an agreement, stipulation, or condition between the parties,
is in. the nature of a contract.
2. Parties -who appear on the face of a contract, to be the only parties bound, cannot introduce parol proof to show that'they are not the parties bound, but the
third persons are in reality the contracting parties.

I We are-indebted to the Reporters, Messrs. Handy, for the early sheets of their
1st volume, where this case will be found, at p. 177.
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3. It is admissible, to show that the act of the party signing the contract, is also
the act of his principal, so as to render the latter also liable.
4. Where the defendant answers that he executed the contract upon which he is
sued, as a broker or agent, and after the testimony is before the Court, claims to
amend his answer so as to show he executed the contract under a mistake of his
legal responsibility thereon, the Court will not grant leave to amend unless the
facts proved, show at least a reasonable probability that this can be established.

This is an action to recover the balance of an advance made on
one hundred barrels of linseed oil, sold by plaintiffs as commission
merchants, for and on account of the defendants. The plaintiffs
have offered as evidence of their contract, in respect to the advance, -and the sale, an instrument, of which the following is a
copy:
"Received, Cincinnati, February 16th, 1854, of James Wilson &
Co., Twenty-six hundred and seventy-five, 0o5 dollars, as an advance on one hundred barrels linseed oil, in their store; for which
advance we agree to pay them interest at the rate of six per cent.
per annum; a commission of two and a half per cent. on sales;
storage (5) cents per barrel per month, and insurance (to be held.
no longer than sixty days).
M. BAILEY & Sox."
The first defence set up by the defendants is, that they are not
personally liable ; that they acted as brokers for other parties;
and that this was known to plaintiffs. Upon this, the firit inquiry is, whether the instrument recited above is a contract? And.
secondly, if it is, whether its effect can be changed, as proposecl by
the defendants?
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GnOLSON, J.-As to the first question, it can scarcely be claimed
that the writing does not constitute a contract. The distinction is
well settled between a mere receipt, acknowledging money paid,
and a receipt containing an agreement, condition, or stipulation,
between the parties. - The latter is in the nature of a contract.
iles vs. Culver, 8 Barb. 205; Coodyear vs. Ogden, 4 Hill, 104.
Upon the principle of these cases, the writing must be deemed a
28
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contract. But in truth, the present may be considered a mvch
stronger case. The expression, "as an advance, ' would seem to
be sufficient to create an obligation to return the money; or, that
it should be returned, under the terms, or in the mode stipulated.
The instrument of writing being a contract, the next question
is, whether the defendants can be permitted to show by parol
proof, that they, though apparently the only parties bound, are
not liable, but that third persons, whose names do not appear on
the face of the instrument, were, in reality, the contracting parties ? And this, I am satisfied, cannot be done. The law on this
point, as collected from several recent authorities, appears to be
plainly opposed to the introduction of parol proof for such a purpose..
Parol testimony is inadmissible for the purpose of introducing
a new party, but not for that of discharging an apparent party
to the contract; where it shows, not that those whom the contract purports to bind, are not bound, but that another is bound,
by reason that the act of the agent in signing the agreement, is also
the act of the principal. Evidence to show that the party apparently
boun&,. as - personally contractiAg, is not so bound, would be to contradict the written agreement. Kean vs. .Davis, 1 Spencer, 425429; 2 Smith's Lead. Cases, 224; Story on Agency, §270; Mggins vs. Senior, 8 M. &W. 834; Magee vs. Atkinson, 2 M. & W.
440 ; Pentz vs. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271-276; &accpole vs. Arnold,
11 Mass. 27.
"The true principle appears to be, that parol testimony is not
admissible, for the purpose of exonerating an agent who has entered into a written contract, in which he appears as principal,
even though he should propose to show, if allowed, that he mentioned his principal." 1 Spencer, 429; 8 Mees. & Welsh. 834; 33
E. C. L. 122.
"If an agent contracts in such a form, as to make himself personally responsible, he cannot afterwards, whether his principal'
were or were not known at the time of the contract, relieve himself
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from that responsibility."
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Denman, C. J., 6 A. & E. 486; 33

E. C. L. 122.
The chief difficulty which has occurred in this class of cases, has
been one of construction ; whether, on the face of the instrument,
the party acts as a principal, or as an agent? That difficulty does
not arise in this case ; for the contract here clearly on its face binds
the defendants.
In this view of the law, as the issue now stands between the
parties, it is not necessary that I should endeavor to reconcile
the contradictory evidence which has been given. It is claimed,
however, by the counsel for the defendants, that they are entitled to such an amendment of their answer, as may enable them
to show that the contract was executed under a mistake, or through
some misapprehension as to their legal responsibility.
To make out such a defence would require very clear proof;
and I should not be justified in permitting the amendment, unless
sutisfied, from the facts proved in the case, that there was at least
a reasonable probability of its being established. As to any material facts, showing a mistake in the execution of the contract, or
that it was even signed under a misapprehension, there is, to say the
least, no preponderance of testimony on the part of the defendants;
much less, that clear and convincing showing, which I understand
the rules of law in such a case to require. Nor, indeed, am I satisfied that the character of the mistake, under which the defendants,
who signed the contract, acted, is of that kind to authorize the relief asked. In anyview, I do not think a proper discretion requires
of me to permit an amendment.
The issue in the case will be found for plaintiffs.
Haines, Todd and Lytle, for plaintiffs.
Caldwell and Burrows, for defendants.

